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The bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") signed
between developed and developing countries are
supposed to increase the flow of investment from the
former to the latter. But the evidence indicates that
the existing approach of guaranteeing special
protections for foreign investors has only a modest
impact on luring their dollars. At the same time they
are failing to produce meaningful benefits, these
treaty commitments create substantial costs for the
host States that make them, exposing them to liability
and constraining their regulatory authority. Given
this state of imbalance, the time seems ripe for a new
approach, but existing proposals for revising BITs are
either insufficient or unrealistic, or in some instances
even counterproductive.
This Article calls for a fundamental redesign of BITs
based on empirically validated premises about how
host States actually attract foreign investment.
Political science and economic studies show that
foreign investors place substantial weight on the
quality of domestic institutions. Existing BITs fail to
promote investment because they are not an adequate
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substitute for these institutions, nor are they effective
in generating reform. The proposed model would
make domestic institutional reform the organizing
principle of BIT design, and the Article offers several
specific provisions that would help achieve that goal.
Such an approach would produce immediate benefits
for host States and so should be particularly attractive
to developing countries. But the institutional reform
model also retains the end goal shared by both sides
of increasing foreign investment and so should be
more realistically attainable than proposals pitched as
benefiting developing States alone.
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INTRODUCTION
The stated purpose of most bilateral investment reaties is to
foster economic cooperation between the States that sign them,
primarily by promoting the flow of capital from developed to
BITs AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
developing countries.1 Yet it is becoming increasingly clear that the
features of most BITs are no longer optimized, if they ever were, to
achieve that goal. A number of empirical studies have found that
BITs do not actually succeed in increasing foreign direct investment
("FDI"), while other studies have found at most a modest impact.2
The existing BIT model, which has largely remained static
since at least the 1980s, emphasizes investor protection.3  The
model's underlying assumption is that BITs succeed in attracting
capital to a developing State by promising foreign investors a special
set of substantive rights and procedural options, as a way to
compensate for the risks posed by a precarious political regime or
immature legal system.4 The empirical literature finding only modest
effects on FDI now casts doubt on that assumption. And at the same
time that BITs appear to be failing to produce their expected benefits,
they are creating substantial costs for capital-importing States, both
in terms of exposing the State to investment treaty liability and
constraining its regulatory authority.
5
This Article calls for a reexamination of the foundational
premises of BIT design. To do so, it looks to empirical research
outside the BIT context, studying other potential influences on FDI
growth. While commitments made in international agreements
appear to have minimal effect on foreign investment, the quality of a
host State's domestic institutions has been shown to make a more
significant difference. Although particular studies differ on which
specific institutional factors matter and to what extent, the empirical
literature is generally consistent in finding that foreign investors take
1. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J.
67, 76 (2005).
2. See Tim Biithe & Helen V. Milner, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign
Direct Investment: A Political Analysis, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND
INVESTMENT FLOWS 171, 176-78 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009)
(summarizing studies).
3. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 74, 76.
4. See id. at 77.
5. See AARON COSBEY ET AL., INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A
GUIDE TO THE USE AND POTENTIAL OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 12-15
(2004), https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment-invest-and-sd.pdf. Some commentators
have further suggested that BITs may affirmatively harm a host State's economy by
transferring control over domestic assets to foreign investors. See Joshua Boone, How
Developing Countries Can Adapt Current Bilateral Investment Treaties to Provide Benefits
to Their Domestic Economies, 1 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 187, 190-92 (2011).
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institutional quality into account in making investment decisions.
6
Based on this empirical evidence, I argue that BITs should be
redesigned to focus on improving domestic institutions as the optimal
way of achieving the ultimate goal of increasing FDI.
As the evidence that BITs are failing to achieve their intended
purpose continues to mount, many have offered ideas to improve on
the status quo. Most scholars have focused on marginal changes that
retain the basic premises of the investor protection model.7 But as I
demonstrate below, these changes would at best reduce the costs of
BITs by pushing back against their intrusion on host State
sovereignty. They are not designed to promote the benefits of
increased FDI that BITs are supposed to yield. More recently,
commentators have begun to brainstorm possibilities for a more
systemic overhaul. These critics are particularly concerned that, even
when developing States succeed in attracting foreign investment,
they often fail to extract the benefits they expect from the
relationship, such as gains in economic development.' Thus, they
propose an alternative BIT model repurposed to specifically promote
the development of host States.
The difficulty with the more systemic proposals-perhaps
why they have yet to gain traction-is that they are framed primarily
around the objectives of only one of the interested parties. By
contrast, my argument for an institutional reform model makes the
case that it is a better bargain for both sides. Although key premises
are reevaluated, the end goal remains the same as that for which the
investor protection model was purportedly designed, namely
promoting FDI. And it is important to remember that increased FDI
is in the interests of not just the importing State but also the exporting
State, which benefits when its investors find more opportunities in
better markets. Thus, the argument for domestic reform is not about
development for the host State's sake alone, but about the prospects
of a better partnership for everyone involved.
At the same time that the proposed model seeks to benefit
both sides, it also addresses a particular need of developing countries.
6. See, e.g., Matthias Busse & Carsten Hefeker, Political Risk, Institutions and
Foreign Direct Investment, 23 EUR. J. POL. EcON. 397, 400-01, 410 (2007); Zdenek Drabek
& Warren Payne, The Impact of Transparency on Foreign Direct Investment, 17 J. ECON.
INTEGRATION 777, 785-87 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment
Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775, 831 (2008) (proposing ways to recalibrate investment
arbitration so that it strikes a better balance between public and private interests).
8. See COSBEY ET AL., supra note 5, at v-vi.
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Whereas the investor protection model left host States to hope that
increased FDI would eventually translate, in some undetermined
manner, into benefits they could capture, the institutional reform
model is specifically designed to produce such benefits. That is
because improving domestic institutions for the particular benefit of
host States is the means to the shared end of increased FDI. The
benefits, in other words, are built-in rather than contingent. Thus,
while the institutional reform model may not accomplish everything
that advocates for developing countries would desire, its adoption
would significantly advance their objectives even while serving the
overlapping interests of capital-exporting States.
The Article will proceed in four parts. Part I will provide an
overview of existing BITs and evaluate how well they are serving
their intended purpose. In particular, after explaining how the
investor protection model is supposed to promote FDI, this Part will
explore evidence suggesting that it has largely failed to do so. Part II
will detail existing reform efforts, including both the incremental
proposals that merely tinker with the investor protection framework
and the systemic proposals that repurpose BITs as instruments for
host State development. Part III will make the case for the shift in
focus to improving domestic institutions, replacing investor
protection with what I will call an institutional reform model. This
Part will detail the general evidence showing that the quality of
domestic institutions is a significant determinant of foreign
investment decisions and highlight the key variables that have been
shown to matter most. This Part will also elaborate on the argument
that an institutional reform model has the potential to be a better
bargain for all interested stakeholders and thus is more realistically
attainable than alternative proposals.
Part IV will then attempt to translate the new model into three
specific proposals, drawing on the key variables identified in the
prior Part. First, BITs should incorporate conditional aid and
technical assistance provisions. In a conditional aid program, the
capital-exporting country would provide aid to the capital-importing
country, with continued receipt being dependent on the achievement
of certain benchmarks. In a technical assistance program, experts
would be sent to work with the relevant actors in the host State to
build the capacity of domestic institutions. Prior or existing efforts in
both of these regards have seen minimal success in fostering
institutional reform. I argue that establishing such programs under
the auspices of a BIT relationship, where each party has a clearer
interest in effective long-term cooperation, has the potential to yield
greater returns.
Conditional aid and technical assistance are the most direct
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ways to address institutional reform, but they would require a
significant investment of resources and are far removed from what
BITs currently contain. The second and third proposals would more
readily fit into the existing structure, but are better described as
facilitating, rather than directly contributing to, the desired reform.
The second proposal involves a redesign of the standard dispute
resolution mechanism to maximize incentives for host States to
improve their domestic judiciaries. Rather than providing for
arbitration at the election of the foreign investor, the revised
approach would permit arbitration only under certain conditions
designed to pressure host States that would prefer to resolve disputes
in their own courts to pursue reform. The third proposal involves
establishing a dispute prevention mechanism that would attempt to
address foreign investor complaints before they escalate. Apart from
resolving individual complaints, such a mechanism could also serve
as a focal point for coordinating broader reform of the institutions
that write and administer the host State's laws.
Before proceeding, it is worth briefly acknowledging a
different implication of the empirical evidence that will not be my
focus here. Given the evidence that BITs, as currently designed, may
be producing more costs than benefits, there is a plausible argument
that the substantive rights provided under the investor protection
model should be scaled back. In other words, if the presence of BIT
protections is not attracting FDI, why leave them in place to be used
against host States by aggrieved foreign investors? At the very least,
an approach that better balances investor p otection and host State
sovereignty would seem to be warranted, and commentators have
proposed ways in which specific substantive protections hould be
recalibrated accordingly. I discuss these proposals in Section II.A
and believe some of them may well be compatible with my own, but
I bracket the question of whether and to what extent a recalibration is
needed. My proposals below assume that some degree of investment
protection would remain in place, but this Article is otherwise
agnostic as to the specific scope that protection should entail.
As a final caveat, I should also emphasize that I am focused
here on BITs between developed and developing countries, which
account for the majority of such treaties.9 An increasing number of
BITs do involve developing States on both sides, and some even
involve two developed nations or other pairs in which there is a
"good chance of reciprocal investment."1 Investment provisions
9. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 74.
10. Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the
Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT'LL. 45, 91 (2013).
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have also appeared in multilateral free trade agreements, and the
trend appears to be going in the direction of more regional
treatymaking.11  Needless to say, the dynamics of all these
relationships are very different, and making progress on just one BIT
paradigm would constitute a worthwhile endeavor.
I. THE INVESTOR PROTECTION MODEL
This Part begins with an overview of BITs and how the
current investor protection model is supposed to promote foreign
investment. It then evaluates the success of that model, drawing on
the empirical literature measuring the impact of BITs as well as
discussing reasons in principle to be pessimistic.
A. The Basic Paradigm
The modern BIT was created in the 1950s, but its content
continued to evolve into the late 1980s, when the basic structure that
still predominates began to take shape. 12 The 1980s marked a turning
point because, as the communist era came to an end, many States that
were formerly closed off to foreign investment developed an interest
in attracting outside capital.13 That change resulted in a dramatic
increase in the number of BITs, from 309 in place as of 1988 to 2181
by 2002, most of them concluded between developing States on the
one side and industrialized nations on the other. 14
These BITs took the form of what commentators have called
a "grand bargain."15 Developing countries see foreign investment as
a way to spur their own growth and development. 16 That is supposed
to occur both through the infusion of needed capital and the
deployment of technology.17 Capital-exporting nations, in turn, have
an interest in facilitating the entry of their investors into new
11. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2012: Towards a
New Generation of Investment Policies, at xx (2012) [hereinafter World Investment Report
2012], http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2012_embargoed-en.pdf.
12. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 73-75.
13. Id. at 74.
14. Id. at 75.
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markets.18 One potential obstacle to an otherwise attractive market is
the presence of political and legal risks. The concern is that, once an
investor begins a venture in and commits resources to a particular
host State, that State will change the rules in a way that benefits itself
and harms the investor.19 Recourse under the host State's domestic
law, and pursued in the local courts, is likely to be inadequate,
particularly in developing countries with immature legal systems.
2
0
BITs attempt to remove this obstacle by supplying, via international
agreement, the investment protection that domestic law fails to
adequately guarantee. In short, the grand bargain entails the host
State's "promise of protection of capital in return for the prospect of
more capital in the future."1
21
What specifically does this promise encompass? The typical
BIT contains substantive protections for investors, ranging from
prohibitions on expropriations without compensation to guarantees of
fair and equitable treatment, of full protection and security, and
against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment.22 It also includes
procedural guarantees, most importantly the option of resolving
disputes with the host State in a neutral arbitral forum such as the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID"). 23 Foreign investors are thereby permitted to bypass the
host State's domestic courts to challenge government regulations or
other actions before a panel of international arbitrators and obtain
relief that is supposed to be enforceable in the courts without further
review .24
In principle, the provisions described above could operate
neutrally, striking a fair balance between the concerns of investors
and needs of host States. On their face, the substantive guarantees
seem like perfectly sensible assurances of fair treatment, and the
procedural option of a neutral arbiter seems like a reasonable
safeguard against potential bias in domestic courts. In practice,
however, the substantive protections have been interpreted in a way
that is perceived as overly generous to investors, and the tribunals
charged with enforcing them are seen as biased in favor of
18. Id. at 76.
19. Id. at 75.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 77 (emphasis omitted).
22. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 13 (2d ed. 2012).
23. Id. at 13, 239.
24. Id. at 239.
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investors.25  To illustrate, tribunals have interpreted the fair and
equitable treatment to require "the stability of the legal and business
framework.126  Although most tribunals acknowledge that this
requirement does not go so far as to freeze in place the preexisting
regulatory scheme, they have struggled to draw a principled line, and
their emphasis on stability opens the door for nearly any regulatory
change to be challenged.27 Another commonly cited formulation of
the fair and equitable treatment standard provides as follows:
The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor,
so that it may know beforehand any and all rules and
regulations that will govern its investments, as well as
the goals of the relevant policies and administrative
practices or directives, to be able to plan its
investment and comply with such regulations.
28
Commentators have pointed out that this formulation of the standard
far exceeds what any country, developing or not, could expect to
achieve.29 Thus, the protections afforded to foreign investors have
likely exceeded what those same investors could have expected from
their own home States.
The criticisms may be overstated. For example, Susan Franck
has shown that investors do not prevail at an unusually high rate; her
2007 study finds that investors won 38.5% of the time.30 Moreover,
the investors who prevailed recovered far less than they initially
sought.3 1 In any event, tribunal practice continues to evolve, and it
may well be headed toward a more balanced approach.
But the fact remains that investment treaty claims that many
25. See, e.g., Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Developing Countries in the Investment
Treaty System: A Law for Need or a Law for Greed?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP 43, 51-61 (Stephan W. Schill et al. eds., 2015)
(criticizing the expansive interpretation of BIT principles to privilege investor protection
over host State sovereignty).
26. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision
on Liability, 125 (Oct. 3, 2006).
27. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 22, at 145-49.
28. Thcnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 154 (May 29, 2003).
29. See Sornarajah, supra note 25, at 56-57, 57 n.30.
30. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 48-52 (2007).
31. Id. at 57-64.
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would deem quite aggressive are at least viable under existing
interpretations of BIT provisions. For example, commentators
reacted with alarm when Philip Morris brought claims challenging
the regulation of cigarette packaging.32 The prevailing sentiment was
that good-faith legislation designed to promote public health should
not be subjected to potential investment treaty liability and scrutiny
by international arbitrators.33  But because existing arbitral
jurisprudence leaves the door open to such claims, countries report a
"chill" on exercises of their regulatory authority as they hesitate to
pass legislation that could give rise to similar challenges.
34
As these costs pile up, the question becomes whether they are
offset by the benefits that BITs provide in terms of attracting
additional foreign investment. The next Section addresses that
question.
B. Evaluation
BITs are supposed to promote economic cooperation by
increasing the flow of FDI, typically from a developed to a
developing country. There are two primary mechanisms by which
they could do so. The first is to increase FDI between the two States
that are parties to a specific treaty by providing assurances of fair
treatment in the host country to investors from the capital-exporting
country. The second is to attract more investment to the developing
State from all sources by sending a broader signal to investors
worldwide about that State's domestic environment for investment.
With both mechanisms, there are empirical studies, as well as reasons
in principle, to support a pessimistic outlook.
32. See, e.g., Alfred de Zayas, Opinion, How Can Philip Morris Sue Uruguay over Its
Tobacco Laws?, GUARDIAN (London) (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2015/nov/16/philip-morris-uruguay-tobacco-isds-human-rights (describing
an arbitration between Philip Morris and Uruguay and calling for the entire investor-State
dispute settlement system to be abolished). Philip Morris's claims against Uruguay were
recently dismissed. See Philip Morris Brands Sirl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case
No. ARB/1I0/7, Award, 590 (July 8, 2016).
33. See de Zayas, supra note 32. In earlier work, I explained in further detail how
arbitral jurisprudence created this conflict between foreign investors' rights and the host
State's authority to regulate in the public interest, and I proposed tools of interpretation to
reduce that conflict. See generally Richard C. Chen, A Contractual Approach to Investor-
State Regulatory Disputes, 40 YALE J. INT'L L. 295 (2015).
34. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and
the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 337, 346 n.46 (2007) (citing
"mixed anecdotal evidence" on regulatory chill).
[55:547
BITs AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONAL REFORM
The first causal pathway is the one that BITs were formally
designed to use. As explained in the prior Section, the investor
protection model was created to provide additional treaty-based
protections for investors from the capital-exporting country.
Whereas they might previously have been deterred from investing
because of perceived instability in the host State's domestic system,
the presence of BIT protections would encourage greater investment
by mitigating those risks. This mechanism for increasing FDI views
BITs as "hands-tying devices" because they create costs for the host
State if it fails to live up to its treaty commitments.
35
Efforts to find evidence of increased FDI specifically between
the two parties of a particular BIT are referred to as dyadic analyses,
and most of them have found at most a marginal effect.36 A couple
of studies have found evidence that U.S. BITs produced a boost in
FDI to the developing country signatory.37 But another study looking
at U.S. FDI flows to a different set of countries during a different
time period contradicted this finding.38
The second mechanism by which BITs could affect FDI is by
sending a signal to investors from all States that the host State "is
generally serious about the protection of foreign investment.' 39 The
signing of BITs suggests, at a minimum, that the State in question
desires to attract investment and would therefore be disinclined to
take measures that would adversely affect its reputation. Moreover,
signing BITs also creates a more concrete incentive for host States to
reform their domestic institutions, because improper actions may
create treaty liability to at least some foreign investors.4" Thus, even
foreign investors not from a country that has entered into a BIT with
the host State could take other BIT signings into account on the
theory that they would stand to benefit from general improvements to
the domestic environment.
Efforts to measure this signaling effect are referred to as
monadic analyses, which examine aggregate FDI flows from any
35. Andrew Kerner, Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 53 INT'L STUD. Q. 73, 76 (2009).
36. See Bithe & Milner, supra note 2, at 176-78 (summarizing studies).
37. See id. at 177-78.
38. See id.
39. Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign
Direct Investment o Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1571 (2005).
40. Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The
Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties, 6 REV. INT'L
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 5 (2011).
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source into capital-importing countries . 41 The results of these studies
are more varied than the dyadic analyses. At least a couple have
found BITs to have a significant impact on FDI.42 Others, however,
have found effectively no impact and suggest that prior findings to
the contrary failed to account for the endogeneity of BIT adoption.
43
In other words, there may be a correlation between BIT adoption and
FDI increases not because the former causes the latter, but because
both are caused by another variable, or the latter causes the former.
44
A recent study by political scientists Jennifer Tobin and
Susan Rose-Ackerman attempts to measure the value of signaling
more precisely by taking into account the quality of host State
institutions. They conclude that BITs are ineffective when they are
used as substitutes for an otherwise unfavorable domestic investment
environment.45  However, they find evidence that BITs can have a
more substantial impact when they complement an existing set of
effective domestic institutions.46  They explain this counterintuitive
result by suggesting that while signing BITs may send a signal about
the host country's commitment to attracting foreign investment,
"they are not the only information about political risk available to
investors.' 47  Thus, a country with weak institutions cannot expect
41. Biithe & Milner, supra note 2, at 176.
42. See Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of Bilateral Investment
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. COMP. ECON. 788, 790 (2004); Neumayer &
Spess, supra note 39, at 1582.
43. See Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment:
Correlation Versus Causation, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS,
supra note 2, at 395, 421-24; see also Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries
Sign BITs?, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, supra note 2,
at 437, 448 (providing evidence that "the signing of BITs was positively correlated with
previous investment levels" and suggesting that this may occur as the result of lobbying by
foreign investors already located in the host State).
44. See Aisbett, supra note 43, at 422.
45. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 2.
46. Id. Others have found similar trends, but noted them more in passing without
attempting to develop the theoretical explanation that Tobin and Rose-Ackerman offer. See
Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit...
and They Could Bite, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS,
supra note 2, at 349, 368; Jason Yackee, Do BITs Really Work?: Revisiting the Empirical
Link Between Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment, in THE EFFECT OF
TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE
TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, supra note 2, at 379, 391.
47. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 5.
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that signing a BIT will dramatically alter investor perceptions, but a
country with stronger institutions can use BITs "to lend credibility to
[its] otherwise favorable domestic environment.
48
With both dyadic and monadic analyses, the mixed nature of
the findings is likely due, at least in part, to poor data quality.49 The
studies also raise a variety of complex methodological issues, such as
how best to isolate the effects of BITs from other simultaneous
changes in the domestic environment.5" Resolving such
methodological debates is beyond the scope of this Article.
For present purposes, it is enough to make two modest points
about the empirical literature. First, with only a handful of positive
studies that might well be outliers, no one would dispute that there is
ample room for improvement. Given that BITs impose meaningful
costs on host States, one would hope to find more robust and
consistent evidence that they are succeeding in promoting FDI.
Second, it is notable that, to the extent there has been evidence of
impact, it tends to come from monadic rather than dyadic analyses.
The implication, most strongly supported by the Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman study, is that BITs are succeeding, if at all, based on their
signaling of a commitment to reform domestic institutions rather than
on promises to protect a particular State's investors.
This latter point is significant because my argument for
improving the effectiveness of BITs seeks precisely to build on-and
strengthen-their capacity to promote such reform. In Part III below,
I show, based on empirical research outside the context of BITs, that
the quality of domestic institutions is an important factor in foreign
investment decisions. That research, combined with the results of
Tobin and Rose-Ackerman's study, supports my argument that BITs
should focus on institutional quality as the optimal path toward
greater FDI.
In any event, the initial takeaway at this point is that there is
some evidence that BITs are already contributing to FDI by signaling
a commitment to domestic institutional reform. But at the same time,
the signal is a modest one, and there is significant potential to
enhance the impact of BITs by increasing the likelihood that signing
48. Id. at 6.
49. See Biithe & Milner, supra note 2, at 178; Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral
Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative
Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT'L L. 397, 410-11 (2011).
50. Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI Flows: An Overview, in
THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS, supra note 2, at xxvii, lv;
see also id. at lv-lvi (identifying other difficult issues).
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them actually produces such reform.
II. EXISTING EFFORTS AND PROPOSALS
The prior Part paints a bleak picture of the international
investment law regime. On one side of the equation, the investor
protection model creates significant costs for capital-importing
States, subjecting them to potential treaty liability and thereby
placing constraints on their regulatory authority. On the other side,
the model appears to have only a marginal impact on attracting
foreign investment. It is no wonder then that developing countries
are questioning whether continued participation in BITs makes
sense.51 And to the extent they begin withdrawing from BITs or
opting out of the international investment law regime, as some have
already done,52 that is a loss for foreign investors and the capital-
exporting States in which they are based. Some commentators take
the view that exit is the best outcome for developing countries: the
system is so deeply flawed that any attempt to realign it is a lost
cause.
53
At least some participants in the regime, however, have
chosen to explore possible ways to reform the system rather than
simply exiting it. Commentators have offered a variety of proposals,
a few of which have begun to be implemented. This Part explores
existing reform efforts and proposals to improve upon the status quo,
divided into the incremental and the more systemic. I explain why
the incremental proposals are likely insufficient, while the more
systemic proposals are likely unrealistic and in some cases even
counterproductive.
My focus in this Part is on reform efforts designed to make
BITs more effective. There is a separate line of critique that sees
international investment law as illegitimate, particularly to the extent
that ad hoc panels of unaccountable arbitrators are empowered to
review the actions of democratically elected governments.
54
51. I emphasize in other places that increasing FDJ is in the interest of capital-
exporting States as well, so the failure of BITs to produce that result is a lost opportunity for
both sides. But because developing States are subject to more investment treaty claims, they
bear the costs disproportionately and thus have more to complain about with the existing
system overall.
52. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 21-23 (2d ed. 2015).
53. See Sornarajah, supra note 25, at 61.
54. See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law's
Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach,
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Commentators taking this view propose, for example, that
international investment law be construed to be more deferential to
State decisions,55 or that the arbitration system be replaced with a
standing investment court.56  There may be some overlap as
proposals designed to improve legitimacy may well enhance
effectiveness at the same time. But the focus of the present
discussion is on ideas for improving the latter specifically.
A. Incremental Proposals
Improving the effectiveness of BITs could mean increasing
their benefits or reducing their costs. Most incremental reform
proposals are focused on the latter. They do not grapple with the
apparent failure of BITs to increase FDI flows, but are instead
concerned primarily with pushing back against perceived intrusions
on host State sovereignty through the aggressive assertion of investor
rights.
The basic concern, alluded to earlier, is that as the scope of
investor protections has grown, even good-faith exercises of
regulatory authority may be challenged under BIT provisions like the
fair and equitable treatment standard.57 The prospect of investment
treaty liability threatens State sovereignty because "State parties to
investment agreements can no longer legislate at will in the public
interest without concern that n arbitral panel will determine that he
legislation constitutes interference with an investment.158 Notably, it
is not only developing countries that are feeling this regulatory
constraint. As capital has begun to flow in increasing levels from
developing to developed countries, and developed countries are
signing investment treaties with each other, even States that are
predominantly capital- exporting have now been on the receiving end
of investment treaty claims.
59
52 VA. J. INT'L L. 57, 66 (2011).
55. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public
Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT'L L.
283, 304-05 (2010) (proposing that arbitral tribunals apply a margin of appreciation,
borrowing the deferential standard used by the European Court of Human Rights in
reviewing the actions of Member States of the Council of Europe).
56. See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 180-
84 (2007).
57. Chen, supra note 33, at 296.
58. Choudhury, supra note 7, at 778.
59. See Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion i Investment Treaty Interpretation:
The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT'LL. 179, 196 (2010).
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A variety of proposals have been offered to address the
intrusion concern, and some have begun to be adopted. One set of
suggestions seeks to revise the substance of BIT protections. That
could mean adding preambular language emphasizing that the
treaty's terms should generally not limit the State's right to regulate
in the public interest60 or language that specifically narrows the scope
of certain protections.61 Thus, for example, the current 2012 version
of the U.S. Model BIT ties the fair and equitable treatment standard
to "the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
of aliens,"62 which is thought to be narrower than the standard
developed and applied by arbitral tribunals.63 A related approach
would provide for carve-outs identifying specific areas, such as
public health regulations, that are exempt from any BIT liability. 64
Another set of proposals attempts to improve the quality of
the arbitration process. For example, Barnali Choudhury argues that
if arbitrators are going to make decisions that affect the public
interest, there needs to be greater transparency to the public as well
as opportunities for public participation through the submission of
amicus curiae briefs.65 Similarly, commentators have suggested that
tribunals review legislation or other State conduct with a greater
degree of deference66 or apply a public law approach that would
evaluate regulations purportedly intruding on investor rights under a
60. See World Investment Report 2012, supra note 11, at 144. In this regard, the
current U.S. Model BIT states that the parties seek to achieve the treaty's "objectives in a
manner consistent with the protection of health, safety, and the environment, and the
promotion of internationally recognized labor rights." Treaty Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment pmbl., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (2012)
[hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT], http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.
pdf. This marked a change from earlier BITs whose preambles tended to focus solely on
investor protection and investment promotion. See Karen Halverson Cross, Converging
Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 151, 190 (2012).
61. See Boone, supra note 5, at 198-99.
62. 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 60, art. 5.
63. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 22, at 134. But see Patrick Dumberry,
Moving the Goal Post! How Some NAFTA Tribunals Have Challenged the FTC Note of
Interpretation on the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard Under NAFTA Article 1105, 8
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REv. 251, 271-72 (2014) (describing how some tribunals have
suggested that he customary international law minimum standard has evolved in the
direction of the more robust treaty standard).
64. See Chen, supra note 33, at 321-22.
65. Choudhury, supra note 7, at 809-17.
66. See Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 55, at 304-05.
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proportionality standard.6 7  As noted earlier, these proposals are
designed in part to improve the legitimacy of the arbitration process
by providing for greater public input and by guarding against overly
intrusive arbitral review. But they may also have an impact on
effectiveness for similar reasons: if tribunals are making better
decisions, and as a general matter deferring more to host States, the
costs of BITs are likely to decrease.
The bottom line is that incremental reforms have gained
traction precisely because they are modest, and because they speak to
the interests of developed countries that are feeling the costs of
regulatory constraint. It is far from clear that they will actually
succeed in achieving the intended goals of limiting costs; much
depends on how arbitrators interpret new provisions and whether
they are interested in reevaluating old ones.68 What does seem clear
is that these modest proposals will have little impact on the other
major concern about BITs, namely that they are failing to
substantially boost FDI levels. These reform efforts are not designed
to achieve that purpose and contain nothing likely to address that
concern. Thus, there is a clear upper limit to how much these efforts




While the literature on BITs has generally focused on
incremental changes that leave the existing framework of investor
67. See Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan W. Schill, Investor-State Arbitration as
Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, Proportionality and the Emerging Global
Administrative Law, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 5, 51-52 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., International Council for
Commercial Arbitration Congress Ser. No. 14, 2009).
68. Some of the proposals described above would require the adoption of new
provisions, but others, such as the proportionality test, are arguably within the power of
tribunals to implement through the interpretation of existing treaties. See id.
69. Stephan Schill, Christian Tams, and Rainer Hofmann argue that the proposals
discussed in this Section could indeed contribute to host State development-in other words,
produce benefits and not merely reduce costs. See Stephan W. Schill et al., International
Investment Law and Development: Friends or Foes?, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 25, at 3, 29-32. However, their
argument is that the proposed changes would remove obstacles to the host State's own
efforts to advance its development. See id. at 29 (arguing that the proposed reforms would
"grant host States sufficient policy space to pursue their development strategies"). That, of
course, is a less ambitious goal than designing BITs to affirmatively contribute to FDI or
economic development.
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protection in place, at least some commentators have begun to
question the viability of that framework. It is particularly troubling
to these critics that even when developing countries succeed in
attracting FDI, the increased investment does not consistently
contribute to the host State's economic growth v.7  The major
alternative that has begun to emerge is a new model focused on host
State development.7v Commentators in this vein take the view that
BITs were never about investor protection, or even about increasing
FDI, in the first place-at least from the standpoint of developing
countries.7 2  Rather, investor protection and increasing FDI were
means to the end of furthering the development of host States.7 3 This
perspective leads to the conclusion that BITs should be
fundamentally repurposed to address development directly, rather
than leaving host States to hope that increased FDI (should it in fact
arrive) will gradually lead to progress in that regard.
Advocates of what can be called a "development model"
propose two categories of changes.7 4 One category involves crafting
provisions that help to ensure that FDI actually adds value to the host
State. This could mean, for example, drafting an admissions clause
that permits host States more flexibility to restrict "low-quality FDI"
that is unlikely to contribute to economic development.7 5 Similarly, a
development model could remove the now-standard prohibition on
performance requirements. As defined by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), performance
requirements "are stipulations, imposed on investors, requiring them
to meet certain specified goals with respect to their operations in the
70. See COSBEY ET AL., supra note 5, at v ([I]t is becoming more and more widely
accepted that the proper goal in attracting investment is quality, rather than quantity. In the
end, if investment does not increase well-being on a sustainable basis, it is not worth having,
much less actively chasing.").
71. For a comprehensive model developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, see World Investment Report 2012, supra note 11, at 132-61.
72. See Yannick Radi, International Investment Law and Development: A History of
Two Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE
GAP, supra note 25, at 69, 73-75.
73. Id.
74. Such advocates would also generally agree with the incremental reforms described
in the prior Section-for example, recalibrating investor protections to create the policy
space host States need to pursue their development agenda. See supra note 69. A third
proposal of incorporating technical assistance provisions is one I also advocate and thus
return to in Section IV.A below.
75. Genevieve Fox, Note, A Future for International Investment? Modifying BITs to
Drive Economic Development, 46 GEO. J. INT'L L. 229, 252 (2014). As Fox explains, many
BITs provide for a presumptive right of admission. See id.
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host country. ' 76 They can involve, among other things, "obligations
to hire local labor, use locally created inputs, maintain partial or joint
ventures with locals, export some percentage of goods produced, or
transfer technology.' 77 Although the trend in recent BITs has been
toward prohibiting such performance requirements, advocates
contend that, if used selectively and appropriately, they can help host
States better capture the benefits that FDI is supposed to produce.
78
A second category of proposed changes is focused on
promoting development that is sustainable. Sustainable development
means pursuing economic growth in a manner that properly takes
into account social and environmental concerns.79  Advocates of a
development model suggest that BITs can incorporate these concerns
by placing obligations on investors, thereby correcting the
asymmetry that exists in current BITs. 0 For example, firms making
certain types of investments could be required to perform impact
assessments that address likely effects on human rights and the
environment.81 BITs could also require firms to agree to certain
corporate social responsibility standards and provide for various
accountability mechanisms, including civil or criminal liability in the
host or home State.
82
The development model, if adopted, has the potential to
meaningfully alter the effectiveness of BITs. The first category of
reforms addresses the benefits side of the equation, while the second
76. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS: NEW EVIDENCE FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES, at 2, U.N. Sales
No. E.03.J.D.32 (2003), http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20037-en.pdf.
77. Fox, supra note 75, at 248 (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. at 249-50; see also Boone, supra note 5, at 196 ("Performance-based
requirements are probably the most powerful regulation method that developing countries do
not use.").
79. Andrea Saldarriaga & Kendra Magraw, UNCTAD's Effort to Foster the
Relationship Between International Investment Law and Sustainable Development, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 25, at
125, 130.
80. See id. at 136-37.
81. J. ANTHONY VANDUZER ET AL., INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 260
(Aug. 2012), https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2012/6th-annual-forum commonwealth-guide.pdf
(prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat).
82. See Markus W. Gehring & Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Overcoming Obstacles
with Opportunities: Trade and Investment Agreements for Sustainable Development, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 25, at
93, 118-20; see also VANDUZER ET AL., supra note 81, at 364-65 (describing different
enforcement mechanisms for investor obligations).
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category goes further than the incremental proposals described in the
prior Section in seeking to reduce costs. The primary concern is that,
unlike the incremental proposals, the development model is one-
sided and not pitched at States that predominantly export capital. It
may be true that developing countries have always seen investor
protection and increasing FDI as means to the end of advancing their
development. But it would be a mistake to equate the motivations of
one contracting State with the parties' shared purpose. In the
absence of a stronger case that the development model is in the
interests of both sides, the proposed revisions may not be realistic
possibilities.
There is an additional concern that aspects of the
development model would be counterproductive if adopted. This is
particularly true of the first category of reforms. Determining what
FDI is likely to contribute to development and imposing conditions to
capture more of its value will be a complex process to get right, and
there is a risk that such actions will not only deter particular investors
but also signal a less favorable environment to the broader business
community. 3 The concern applies to a lesser extent o the second
category of reforms. Because of the general movement in the
international community toward valuing sustainable development,
8 4
the incorporation of such principles in BITs would likely be
perceived as responsible governance rather than as an indication of
hostility to FDI. But the concern of deterring investment does not
fully disappear because individual firms may be dissuaded and
particular BITs that overreach in this area may still end up sending a
problematic signal.
Advocates of the development model have advanced the
conversation and generated many useful ideas. Their more
aggressive proposals may in fact work for host States that are, for
example, rich in resources or otherwise seen as attractive markets
because they possess greater leverage in the negotiation process.
Moreover, it is conceivable that in some instances capital-exporting
countries will be sufficiently motivated by altruism or strategic
considerations to enter BITs that prioritize sustainable
development. 5 But there are strong reasons to doubt that the
83. See Fox, supra note 75, at 249-50 (acknowledging this concern for performance
requirements).
84. As one example, the United Nations General Assembly recently adopted a
resolution identifying seventeen sustainable development goals for the international
community to pursue. G.A. Res. 70/1 (Oct. 21, 2015).
85. The model may also be appropriate for pairs of developing countries that expect
capital to flow equally both ways.
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development model will be viable in many or perhaps most instances.
As explained in Section III.C below, the model proposed here is
intended to be pitched as a better bargain for all involved and thus
more realistically attainable, even if it does not offer everything that
advocates of the development model would like in an ideal world.
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL REFORM MODEL
Having described and evaluated the shortcomings of existing
reform efforts, I turn in this Part to the case for an institutional reform
model. The literature on BITs indicates that they are having at best a
modest impact on increasing FDI. Meanwhile, empirical studies on
the determinants of FDI find that domestic institutional quality is one
key factor. Section III.A details that evidence. In light of all the
available evidence on what works and what does not, Section III.B
argues for a redesign of BITs to focus on improving domestic
institutions in order to increase their effectiveness in promoting FDI.
Finally, Section III.C explains why the institutional reform model has
the potential to be a better bargain for both sides and thus should be
more realistically attainable than other systemic proposals that have
been offered.
A. The Importance of Domestic Institutions
Political scientists and economists have extensively explored
the relationship between domestic political and legal institutions, on
the one hand, and foreign direct investment, on the other. Their
conclusions vary in the extent of the correlation and in their
assessment of which specific institutional factors matter most. But
the literature is generally consistent in concluding that a meaningful
correlation exists.
To be clear at the outset, no one suggests that the quality of a
State's institutions is the driving factor in a firm's decision to invest
there. Evidence and common sense suggest that the nature and scope
of the business opportunity provide the initial motivation.8 6 The
86. See John Hewko, Special Report, Foreign Direct Investment in Transitional
Economies: Does the Rule of Law Matter?, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Fall 2002, at 71, 73.
Economic factors that make a host country attractive include "a large domestic market,
sustainable growth, sufficient economic and infrastructure development and/or high natural
resources endowment." Kyeonghi Baek & Xingwan Qian, An Analysis on Political Risks
and the Flow of Foreign Direct Investment in Developing and Industrialized Economies,
ECON., MGMT., & FiN. MARKETS, Dec. 2011, at 60, 64.
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absence of political and legal risks is probably never an affirmative
reason in itself to invest in a country. And when those risks are
present, the investment may nonetheless be deemed justified based
on the size of the business opportunity, and the risks simply treated
as issues to be managed.
87
Nonetheless, common sense also suggests that the extent of
those risks would affect a firm's calculation on whether and how
much to invest in a particular location, assuming it is sufficiently
attractive from an economic perspective. Weak institutions can
increase costs and create inefficiencies for businesses in general,
whether foreign or domestic.88 Moreover, because their investments
often result in sunk costs, foreign firms are "especially vulnerable to
any form of uncertainty, including uncertainty stemming from poor
government efficiency, policy reversals, graft or weak enforcement
of property rights and of the legal system in general."8 9 Thus, the
quality of a State's institutions would be expected to affect the l vel
of FDI at least at the margins, and the evidence supports such a
relationship.
Early investigations of this relationship looked for links
between investment and general concepts like political risk or
uncertainty. A typical such study uses a regression analysis to
examine how one or more specified variables relate to FDI levels in a
group of countries. For example, a 1985 study on political and
economic determinants of FDI in fifty-four developing countries
concluded that the variable of political instability significantly
reduced the inflow of FDI.9° Similarly, a 1996 study found a
significant correlation between political risk and FDI inflows, with
the impact increasing for countries that received higher levels of
FDI.91 This research, although not conclusive, provides support for
the reasonable notion that decreased risk in a country's political and
legal system would correlate with higher levels of investment.
In addition to regression analyses, researchers have relied on
surveys of firms for evidence of the relevance of political risk. Early
surveys on the subject found "that executives report political
87. See Hewko, supra note 86, at 73-74; see also Yackee, supra note 49, at 435-36.
88. Agn~s B~nassy-Qu~r6 et al., Institutional Determinants of Foreign Direct
Investment, 30 WORLD ECON. 764, 765 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Friedrich Schneider & Bruno S. Frey, Economic and Political Determinants of
Foreign Direct Investment, 13 WORLD DEV. 161, 166, 173 (1985).
91. Kwang W. Jun & Harinder Singh, The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment
in Developing Countries, TRANSNAT'L CORPS., Aug. 1996, at 67, 87. Additional studies are
collected in Baek & Qian, supra note 86, at 64.
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instability to be the most important variable influencing their foreign
investment decisions, aside from market potential.92 More recent
studies have similarly identified political risk as the key constraint on
investment when the opportunity is otherwise attractive from an
economic standpoint. For example, a 2007 survey of 602 executives
from multinational corporations around the world identified "political
risk and governance issues [as] the most prominent barriers to
investment into emerging markets."93  Moreover, survey responses
indicated a perception that political risk was becoming a bigger
concern than it had been in the past.94 A 2009 survey of a similar
population likewise ranked political risk first on a list of constraints
on foreign investment in emerging markets, ahead of factors such as
macroeconomic stability, access to financing, infrastructure capacity,
and access to qualified staff.95
More recent studies have broken political risk-or its flipside,
institutional quality-down into discrete components to better
understand their influence on FDJ. Some of these components, such
as a concern about political violence,96 will be set aside because
however important hey may be, they are likely beyond the scope of
what an economic treaty could meaningfully address. Others, such as
the question of regime type, will be bracketed because the research
has pointed to contradictory conclusions.97  The focus for the
92. Schneider & Frey, supra note 90, at 162 (citing YAIR AHARONI, THE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DECISION PROCESS (1966); RAGHBIR S. BASI, DETERMINANTS OF UNITED STATES
PRIVATE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (1963)).
93. Matthew Shinkman, The Investors' View: Economic Opportunities Versus
Political Risks in 2007 11, in WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS TO 2011: FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL RISK 84, 84, 87 (Laza Kekic & Karl P.
Sauvant eds., 2007), http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/wip-2007-web.pdf.
94. Id. at 87-88.
95. WORLD BANK GRP.: MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE AGENCY, WORLD
INVESTMENT AND POLITICAL RISK 2009, at 66, 70 (2010), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/
2013/11/WIPR 2009.pdf. The survey defined political risk as "breach of contract by
governments, restrictions on currency transfer and convertibility, expropriation, political
violence (war, civil disturbance and terrorism), non-honoring of government guarantees,
adverse regulatory changes, and restrictions on FDI outflows in home countries." Id. at 28.
96. See Baek & Qian, supra note 86, at 66 (noting that "[w]ar and political violence-
on both the domestic and international level-deter foreign investment").
97. In particular, studies have reached conflicting conclusions on whether having a
democratic government correlates with more or less FDI. The competing forces at work are
readily identifiable. On the one hand, democratic governance may exacerbate political risk
by increasing "policy instability" and allowing domestic interest groups to influence
policymaking to the detriment of foreign firms. Nathan Jensen, Political Risk, Democratic
Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment, 70 J. POL. 1040, 1042 (2008). On the other
hand, democratic governments may be less politically risky because they are more
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remainder of this Section will be on the institutional factors that have
been identified as relevant to the foreign investment decision-making
process and that can serve as a foundation on which to base proposals
for a new BIT model. As with the above studies of political risk in
general, I rely on both regression analyses and survey evidence in
drawing the below conclusions.
First, foreign investors value a transparent and rational
policymaking process.9" Undoubtedly the actual substance of a host
State's laws is important, as investors will be drawn to environments
that offer favorable tax laws and financial regulations.99 But there is
independent value in a well- functioning process. Rules in general are
likely to be more effective when affected parties have a voice in
shaping them, and business rules in particular likely benefit from the
input of firms, including foreign-owned ones.100 Moreover, foreign
investors worried about sunk costs are particularly sensitive to policy
instability and uncertainty.10 1  While even rational rulemaking
institutions are liable to change course sometimes, they are at least
less likely to veer off in arbitrary directions.
Second, foreign investors value an efficient bureaucracy. 
102
Apart from the institutions that create laws and regulations,
businesses must be concerned about the range of government
officials who implement and administer them. Excessive red tape
transparent and more sensitive to the reputation harms that would come from mistreatment
of foreign investors. Id. at 1041. Moreover, some scholars have suggested that some
democracies actually have greater policy stability and that allowing input into the
policymaking process is on the whole beneficial to foreign firms. Id. Given these complex
dynamics, it is unsurprising that empirical studies have produced contradictory results. See
id. at 1043.
98. See Baek & Qian, supra note 86, at 64-65.
99. See Christian Daude & Ernesto Stein, The Quality of Institutions and Foreign
Direct Investment, 19 ECON. & POL. 317, 322, 327 (2007) (finding that regulatory quality,
defined to reflect the "content of policies," has the largest impact on the volume of FD).
100. Hewko, supra note 86, at 76.
101. Baek & Qian, supra note 86, at 64 (noting that "policy instability and arbitrary
regulation in FDI-related policies create uncertain investment environments and hurt the
profitability of foreign investments").
102. Busse & Hefeker, supra note 6, at 407 (finding "bureaucratic quality [to be]
positively associated with FDI flows"); Daude & Stein, supra note 99, at 321-22, 327
(finding that government effectiveness, defined to include "indicators on the quality of
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the quality of public service provision, and
the credibility of the government's commitment to its policies," has a significant effect on
FDI); Drabek & Payne, supra note 6, at 788 (citing "[a]dministrative inefficiency [as]
probably today the most frequently observed deterrent to FDI").
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interferes with the efficient conduct of business.103  Corruption
similarly "produces bottlenecks, heightens uncertainty, and raises
costs,"1 0 4 with the added concern of forcing investors to choose
between forgoing an opportunity entirely and paying a bribe that
could lead to criminal liability. 10 5  By contrast, an efficient
bureaucracy allows firms to reduce costs and minimize distractions
as they focus on their actual value-creating business activity.
Third, foreign investors value an independent judiciary
capable of enforcing contract and property rights. 106 Scholars have
long noted the connection between a strong judiciary and a hospitable
environment for investment, emphasizing that even the "best"
substantive law will be of little value in the absence of effective court
enforcement. 107 Foreign investors, like all commercial actors,
depend on the presence of efficient and impartial courts to ensure that
their contract and property rights will be protected.108 Backlogged
courts with slow processing times, or judges who are subject to
bribery or government influence, interfere with business activity by
negating that expectation. Outside the context of commercial
103. See Hewko, supra note 86, at 74 ("Nothing exasperates an investor more than the
need to shuffle from ministry to ministry or to negotiate a seemingly endless bureaucratic
maze where everyone and no one is in a position to resolve issues or grant approvals."); see
also SCOTT YUNXIANG GUAN, CHINA'S TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORMS: FROM MONOPOLY
TOWARDS COMPETITION 133-34 (2003) (describing how excessive bureaucratic discretion
has created problems for investors in the telecommunications industry in China); Mark Dutz
et al., Turkey's Foreign Direct Investment Challenges: Competition, the Rule of Law, and
EU Accession, in TURKEY: ECONOMIC REFORM & ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 261,
275 (Bernard M. Hoekman & Sibidey Togan eds., 2005) (noting how "insufficient respect
for the rule of law," including the "uneven application of bureaucratic red tape," can
"profoundly damage any country's investment climate").
104. Mohsin Habib & Leon Zurawicki, Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment, 33 J.
INT'L BUS. STUD. 291, 292 (2002).
105. See Drabek & Payne, supra note 6, at 785.
106. See Glen Biglaiser & Joseph L. Staats, Do Political Institutions Affect Foreign
Direct Investment? A Survey of U.S. Corporations in Latin America, 63 POL. RES. Q. 508,
517 (2010) (summarizing survey results as "suggest[ing] that CEOs prefer countries that
provide investment safety linked to adherence to rule of law, upholding of private property
rights, [and] use of a relatively efficient and effective court system"). The same authors
conducted a regression analysis of judicial institutions in Latin America and found that
"countries in the region with greater judicial strength and rule of law tend to receive higher
levels of FDI." Joseph L. Staats & Glen Biglaiser, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin
America: The Importance of Judicial Strength and Rule of Law, 56 INT'L STUD. Q. 193, 200
(2012) [hereinafter FDI in Latin America].
107. See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 93 (2006).
108. See FDI in Latin America, supra note 106, at 193-94.
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disputes, a strong judiciary also provides a valuable check on
arbitrary policymaking and other forms of government overreach,
thus contributing to good governance more broadly. 109
In short, foreign investors are attracted to host States with
effective lawmaking, administrative, and judicial institutions. The
preceding three factors flesh out what that looks like, but the basic
point is straightforward and intuitive. The next Section addresses
how these factors can lay the foundation for a new BIT model
premised on domestic institutional reform.
B. Translation to BITs
Given the evidence that strong institutions that reduce
political risk help to attract foreign investment, I argue that BITs
should be redesigned to promote domestic institutional reform.
Before developing that argument, I pause to address why the investor
protection model fails to address these same political risk concerns.
Recall that, as described in Section I.A, political risk was the very
problem BITs were supposed to help overcome. But the empirical
evidence discussed in Section 1.B suggested that BITs are not seen as
adequate substitutes for weak domestic institutions, and it is worth
elaborating on why that may be so.
Consider first the option of arbitration, which was intended to
allow foreign investors to bypass a weak or potentially biased
domestic judiciary. But it is in fact an incomplete solution. The host
State's courts may still be needed to adjudicate non-treaty-based
disputes (either with the State itself or with private parties) and to
enforce arbitral awards.110 Thus, the quality of the legal system still
matters to foreign investors, as they cannot expect o avoid contact
with it entirely. Relatedly, despite the perception that the investor-
State arbitration regime is biased in favor of investors, some evidence
exists to suggest that investors are routinely disappointed in the
outcomes of that process. 11
109. See id. at 194.
110. See Franck, supra note 34, at 369-70 (describing the role of national courts in
enforcing arbitral awards and adjudicating domestic law disputes); cf Daniel Berkowitz et
al., Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 163, 167 (2004)
(noting, in the context of international trade, that although private parties may attempt to
contract for private dispute resolution, they may still need domestic courts to enforce
compliance with any arbitral ruling).
111. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Of course, it may be that investors
are feeling disappointed because they have been bringing unmeritorious claims or
overstating their damages, but there is at least reason to think that access to arbitration is far
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Moreover, apart from encounters with the legal system,
foreign investors have reason to be concerned about the quality of
governance more generally. The ability to enforce legal rights is
undoubtedly important, but not every wrong or inefficiency caused
by a weak institution produces a cognizable legal claim, under BITs
or otherwise. Firms that are concerned about an inefficient
bureaucracy or arbitrary policymaking are thus unlikely to be fully
reassured by the substantive protections that BITs provide. And so it
is not surprising that empirical studies have generally painted a
pessimistic picture about the capacity of BITs to increase bilateral
FDI flows.
What about the second mechanism by which BITs were
supposed to contribute to FDI growth-by sending a broader signal
that the host State is committed to improving its environment for
investment? The studies on this effect were slightly more promising,
and commentators have argued that signing BITs should in fact
create incentives for domestic reform.112  But this impact has not
been consistently discernible, and the more nuanced study by Tobin
and Rose-Ackerman finds that BITs attract FDI primarily when the
host State already has effective domestic institutions.113 Adequate
existing institutions are needed because investors have access to
other information, and if that information suggests a "weak
investment environment," the signal sent by the signing of a BIT is of
negligible value. 
114
Accordingly, even those who defend the existing model on
the ground that it incentivizes host State reform would likely agree
that the model is not optimally designed for that purpose. Any effect
that BITs as currently constituted have on domestic institutions is a
byproduct of the investor protection provisions rather than a designed
feature. Host States may decide against particular reforms or reform
from a panacea for harmed foreign investors.
112. See Celine Tan, Reviving the Emperor's Old Clothes: The Good Governance
Agenda, Development and International Investment Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP, supra note 25, at 147, 159 ("Host state
signatories to [international investment agreements] risk incurring significant costs if they do
not reform domestic institutions to give effect to treaty standards of protection, including
direct costs of litigation for treaty breaches and any ensuing compensatory damages to the
foreign investor as well as indirect costs, such as the ... effects of reputational loss."); see
also Benjamin K. Guthrie, Note, Beyond Investment Protection: An Examination of the
Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule of Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1151, 1192-97 (2013) (describing more specific mechanisms by which BITs would
influence domestic institutions).
113. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
114. Tobin & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 40, at 2.
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in general because the expense of pursuing it outweighs the costs of
noncompliance. Or they might simply try and fail. Foreign
investors, in turn, may give some weight to the presence of a BIT in
evaluating the risks of investing in a particular State, but the signal is
not reliable enough to produce a substantial impact.
The question then becomes whether a redesigned BIT that
specifically focuses on the improvement of host State institutions
could have a more substantial impact on FDI. Reserving the question
of how such improvements are to be achieved for the next Part, I
contend that, if BITs can facilitate such changes, increased FDI is
likely to follow for two reasons. First, as the host State's
environment for investment begins to improve, foreign investors
should take notice and adjust their decisions accordingly. Notably,
any resulting increase in FDI in this scenario would be more
sustainable, because it would be based on concrete progress on the
ground rather than on the abstract signaling that the investor
protection model offers. Second, once BITs could be shown to
facilitate institutional reform on a consistent basis, the previously
limited signaling value would become more meaningful. In other
words, foreign investors could now more reasonably rely on the
signing of BITs to indicate that positive changes in the host State
were forthcoming, and so the benefits of increased investment could
arrive before the changes themselves.
Two caveats should be acknowledged so as not to exaggerate
the potential value of a redesigned BIT. First, as noted above, the
absence of political risk is generally not an affirmative reason to
invest in a particular State.115 Thus, there is a limit to how much can
be accomplished through institutional reform; investors must still see
an economic opportunity for the removal of risk barriers to have an
impact. Second, studies suggest that firms do not conduct systematic
evaluations of political risk, but rather make assessments in an ad
hoc, impressionistic manner. 116 This suggests that even if BITs begin
to produce concrete improvements in host State institutions, any
corresponding increases in FDI may not happen immediately and will
115. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
116. See Hewko, supra note 86, at 74 (noting that investors' risk perceptions are "rarely
based on a thorough understanding of the political, social, legal, and cultural situation in the
country, but, rather, on information obtained from newspaper headlines and television news
reports back home, anecdotes from previous trailblazers, [or] perceptions as to what their
competitors were thinking and doing"); Yackee, supra note 49, at 431 (describing a study
finding that "political risk analysis was often weakly institutionalized, with managers often
possessing only a 'diffuse, subjective, and impressionistic' perception of political risk"
(quoting STEPHEN J. KOBRIN, MANAGING POLITICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: STRATEGIC
RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 113 (1982))).
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depend on the gradual evolution of perceptions among the business
community. Relatedly, recent survey evidence suggests that
investors possess only a "low level of familiarity with BITs" and that
they have "a low level of influence over FDI decisions." 117 Given
increasing media coverage of BITs as a result of high-profile
investor-State disputes, investor awareness may well be on the rise,
but to the extent this lack of familiarity persists, it would limit the
signaling value that even a redesigned BIT would have.
The above caveats notwithstanding, the point remains that
there is significant unharnessed potential in BITs to produce more
gains in FDI for developing countries. The institutional reform
model may help realize that potential.
C. A Better Bargain
As alluded to earlier, the investor protection model has been
referred to as a grand bargain, in which developing countries agree to
limit their sovereignty as a way to attract foreign investment from
developed countries.11 But as things currently stand, the evidence
suggests that host States are incurring the costs of regulatory
constraint without substantial corresponding ains in increased FDI.
Moreover, as noted in Section II.B, the foreign investment that
developing countries have received has not consistently led to the
economic growth that provided the motivation for their participation.
The institutional reform model has the potential to be a better
bargain for both sides. First, it should be remembered that it is in the
two States' shared interest to increase FDI: developing countries
want to attract it, but developed countries are also seeking to cultivate
more and better outlets for their investors. Thus, if the empirical
evidence indicates that better domestic institutions in the host State
are key to promoting FDI, then both States stand to benefit from such
improvements. This argument distinguishes my proposal from the
ones I criticized in Section II.B as politically unrealistic. Whereas a
shift toward emphasizing the development of host States would likely
be resisted as a one-sided repurposing, the institutional reform model
can be pitched as an opportunity to produce gains for both States.
At the same time, the value of improved domestic institutions
to the host State specifically should not be overlooked. An important
feature of the proposed model is that it builds in benefits for the host
State, rather than leaving them contingent on some trickle-down
117. Yackee, supra note 49, at 429.
118. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text.
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effect. In other words, while the ultimate shared goal of increasing
FDI remains the same, the proposed model seeks to improve host
State institutions as the means toward that end. And such
improvements would of course be beneficial in and of themselves,
apart from the value they bring in increased FDI. 119 By contrast, the
investor protection model assumed that increased FDI would
eventually result in benefits to the host State but did nothing to
promote that outcome.120 Thus, while the institutional reform model
may not go as far as advocates for developing countries would prefer,
it is designed to produce value for them immediately, even as it seeks
to more effectively accomplish the shared goal.
A shift to an institutional reform model is not without costs,
particularly to capital-exporting States. Some of the proposals
discussed in the next Part require an investment in resources by
developed countries; others could be perceived as a contraction of the
protections afforded to foreign investors. On the flipside, any payoff
in terms of increased FDI may take time to materialize. Thus, the
value proposition to capital-exporting States may not be as self-
evident as it is to host States. That said, given the dissatisfaction
among developing countries with the current model, ideas to improve
the arrangement from their perspective are sorely needed. The
approach I propose is a more plausible compromise than others that
have been offered, with at least the potential to be a better bargain for
all participants in the long run.
IV. THREE PROPOSALS
This Part begins the conversation about how BITs can be
designed to foster improvements to the domestic institutions of
developing countries. The first proposal would most directly serve
that purpose, but would also be the farthest afield from what BITs
currently contain and would require a substantial investment of
resources. The second and third proposals would help to facilitate
rather than directly produce institutional reform, but could be
implemented more readily into the existing structure. The three
proposals could work well together or be adopted independently of
each other.
119. An important caveat to this point is that reforms designed to please foreign
investors or the business community do not necessarily spillover into benefits for the public
at large. I plan to return to this question of when and how such benefits can be more broadly
distributed in future research.
120. See supra notes 70-74.
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As noted in the Introduction, I have bracketed the question of
how, if at all, the substantive protections generally provided for under
the current model should be revised. My analysis of the
shortcomings of existing BITs would support an argument for
reducing foreign investor protections because the evidence suggests
they may be producing greater costs than benefits. 121 Others have
made proposals for how that recalibration should be done, including
ideas I summarized in Section II.A. My primary critique of those
proposals was that they addressed only the costs of BITs and offered
nothing to improve their capacity to promote FDI. But the proposals
I offer here to enhance the benefits side of the equation may well be
compatible with a simultaneous effort to reduce the costs.
A. Conditional Aid and Technical Assistance
The first proposal is that BITs should include commitments
by developed States to provide conditional aid and technical
assistance to developing countries to promote the institutional reform
needed to enhance FDI. Of the proposals offered in this Part, this
one most directly addresses the issue of improving host State
institutions. It is also the farthest afield from what the current model
of BITs encompasses. Rather than focusing solely on reciprocal
commitments by each State to the other's investors, these novel
provisions would create a deeper partnership between the two States
themselves. The provisions would require a significant investment of
resources by the developed State in particular, but they would have
the potential to trigger meaningful reforms and ultimately yield
greater benefits for both sides.
While this Article is the first to make the case for expressly
linking BITs and domestic institutional reform, the concept of foreign
aid to assist in capacity building has a long history. Foreign aid in
general was traditionally focused on stimulating economic
development by, among other things, supporting infrastructure
improvements, delivering new technologies, and providing for basic
needs.122 Countries acting individually, as well as collectively
through international organizations like the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, provide aid based on a combination of
altruistic and self-interested motives.123  Since around the 1980s,
121. See supra Section I.B.
122. Steven Radelet, Foreign Aid, in 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 98, 105 (Amitava Krishna Dutt & Jaime Ros eds., 2008).
123. Id. at 101-05. Self-interested motives include advancing the foreign policy agenda
of the donor state or promoting "the economic interests of certain firms or sectors in the
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countries and organizations providing aid began to focus on
promoting the rule of law in recipient States. 124 These efforts grew
out of a recognition that aid on the whole was failing to contribute to
the recipient country's growth and development.125  The missing
ingredient was thought to be the rule of law and institutions that
could put the received aid to effective use, and so aid for the specific
purpose of institution-building became a priority. 
126
The rule of law continues to serve as a guiding ideal for social
progress, and empirical evidence exists to support he belief that its
presence in a State is correlated with effective development.12 7 But
actually translating the high-level ideal into concrete steps that can be
taken to achieve it has proved to be elusive. 128 The reasons for this
are many. One is a disagreement about what the rule of law actually
entails. Rachel Kleinfeld finds that the concept has been "used to
imply at least five different goals: making the state abide by law,
ensuring equality before the law, supplying law and order, providing
efficient and impartial justice, and upholding human rights."
' 129
Actors working to promote the rule of law refer inconsistently to
these different definitions, and some remain "hotly disputed." 13 0
There are also problems with foreign aid programs in general
that show up in the rule-of-law aid context specifically. First, foreign
aid may have the effect of reinforcing the status quo. Ineffective
governments that citizens would have sought o replace may survive
longer because aid allows them to provide a minimally adequate level
donor country." Id. at 104.
124. Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 15, 15 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
125. Id. at 16-17.
126. Id. at 17 ("It has become a new credo in the development field that if developing
and postcommunist countries wish to succeed economically they must develop the rule of
law.").
127. Tjasa Redek & Andrej Susjan, The Impact of Institutions on Economic Growth:
The Case of Transition Economies, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES 995, 998-1002 (2005) (summarizing
studies).
128. The parallels to the present Article are hard to miss. The institutions that are
important to attracting foreign investment are likewise key to fostering economic growth
from a purely domestic standpoint. See id. at 999 (describing a study in which "property
rights" and "regulatory institutions" were found to have a significant impact on economic
growth).
129. Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE
RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 124, at 31, 34-35.
130. Id. at 35.
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of services.131 Political elites who lack the will to seek reform may
use aid money for patronage purposes, enabling themselves to retain
their positions or status. 13 2 Aid money also creates more opportunity
for corruption, when new public funds are available to be used for
various forms of private gain. 133 The lack of progress persists even
when aid is made on a conditional basis. That happens both because
metrics to measure progress are difficult to identify and because aid
providers have a strong bias toward continuing to disburse funds
regardless of their effectiveness. 
134
Although these are serious obstacles, there are nonetheless
potential solutions and reasons to believe that BITs can provide a
proper setting for implementing them. As an initial point, regarding
the definitional problem, this Article proposes focusing on the issue
of improving institutions rather than seeking to advance particular
substantive ends. In other words, the goal is to reform key
institutions that are known to be necessary to support the rule of law.
Some aid providers use precisely this same approach. In a report on
U.S. rule-of-law aid efforts, for example, the Government
Accounting Office defined the scope of its subject as follows:
Throughout this report, we use the phrase "rule of
law" to refer to U.S. assistance efforts to support legal,
judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts
undertaken by foreign governments. This term
encompasses assistance to help reform legal systems
(criminal, civil, administrative, and commercial laws
and regulations) as well as judicial and law
enforcement institutions (ministries of justice, courts,
and police, including their organizations, procedures,
and personnel).135
131. Radelet, supra note 122, at 107-08.
132. See Katherine Erbeznik, Note, Money Can't Buy You Law: The Effects of Foreign
Aid on the Rule of Law in Developing Countries, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 873, 885-
86(2011).
133. Id. at 886.
134. Id. at 891. Erbeznik elaborates on the incentives facing aid providers, which
answer to the citizens of donor countries. "[T]hese citizens," she explains, "have almost no
ability to monitor the effect of aid on rule of law reform .... As a result, the success of the
aid agencies is measured by the volume of input-money given, in other words-as opposed
to output or real reform." Id. She adds, "The other problem with aid agencies' incentives is
that their continued existence depends on the premise that foreign aid can produce reform. If
foreign aid is anathema to reform, the aid agency has no purpose and will not continue to be
funded." Id. at 892.
135. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFF., GAO/NSIAD-99-158, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: RULE
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Kleinfeld identifies several problems with this institutional
approach, most prominently that it may result in providers attempting
to duplicate their country's own institutions and produce formal
change without making a meaningful difference on the ground. 136
Although these concerns are valid, they can likely be managed by
effective partnering of the sort I recommend below, which is
intended to allow recipient States to customize institutions to advance
their tailored vision of the rule of law.
Apart from the definitional concern, the two major steps that
can be taken to improve the effectiveness of aid are obtaining
effective buy-in from the recipient State and requiring accountability.
BITs can help carry out these goals by establishing a committee
consisting of representatives of both States that is charged with
administering funds for defined purposes, establishing metrics for
performance, and monitoring progress on those metrics. As I will
explain, while these steps could be taken outside the context of a BIT
relationship, there is reason to believe they will hold particular
promise in this specific setting.
Obtaining buy-in starts with giving the recipient State a voice
in shaping reform. This has the benefit of increasing the likelihood
that the recipient State will actually do the work of pursuing reform.
Such buy-in is critical because otherwise "recipient governments will
do just enough to guarantee a continued flow of revenue."
' 137
Effective reform, by contrast, depends on state actors developing a
normative "commitment to reform even when no one is watching." 
138
Equally important, giving the recipient State a voice makes it more
likely that proposed reforms will be properly tailored to address the
State's needs and fit the State's culture. Experience shows that States
cannot merely copy the institutions of another and expect them to
take hold and produce the rule of law. 139 Giving the recipient State a
role in shaping the relevant institutions would go a long way toward
establishing the foundation for their ultimate success.
OF LAW FUNDING WORLDWIDE FOR FISCAL YEARS 1993-98, at 1 n.1 (1999), http://www.
gao.gov/assets/230/227749.pdf (report to congressional requesters).
136. Kleinfeld, supra note 129, at 50-52.
137. Erbeznik, supra note 132, at 887.
138. Id. Gustav Ranis goes a step further to argue that reform packages should be
designed entirely by the prospective recipient, with donors responding more passively like a
commercial bank. Gustav Ranis, Towards the Enhanced Effectiveness of Foreign Aid, in
FOREIGN AID FOR DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND THE NEW AGENDA 57, 60
(George Mavrotas ed., 2010). While this goes farther than my proposal, the underlying
rationale of increasing the recipient country's sense of ownership is the same.
139. See Kleinfeld, supra note 129, at 51-52.
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Once buy-in is achieved, there must also be accountability.
That starts with setting appropriate benchmarks, which in itself is not
a simple task. Past efforts at making aid conditional have tended to
focus on formal change, such as the enacting of laws and regulations
or the creation of an institution. 140 Those are, of course, only first
steps, as laws must actually be enforced and institutions must
actually function properly. But metrics on effectiveness are hard to
develop, particularly when progress is likely to be gradual. There is
no simple solution to these difficulties, except to emphasize that a
long-term commitment to the process at least has a chance of
resolving them. Apart from benchmarks and metrics, accountability
also requires monitoring and actual enforcement of conditions. As
noted earlier, a key reason that conditional aid has previously been
less effective than expected is that aid providers have failed to follow
through on the enforcement of conditions. 
141
Other commentators have proposed steps along these same
lines outside the BIT context, 142 and while they have been attempted
on a fairly limited basis, there are examples of success stories.
143 I
do not suggest that a BIT relationship is necessary to implement
these measures, but rather that they have particular potential in a BIT
context. The main reason is that BITs represent-to some extent
under the present model, but even more so under the proposed
institutional reform approach-a commitment to long-term economic
cooperation, thereby creating the conditions for a more effective
partnership. The capital-exporting State, seeking to cultivate a
foreign market for its investors, will have a more specific, vested
interest in seeing aid succeed than a typical aid provider does.
Likewise, the longer time horizon under which the contracting States
would be working allows for more effective cooperation between
them in the slow process of reform, from the development of ideas
through the supervision of implementation.
With regard to accountability in particular, there is a further
140. See Radelet, supra note 122, at 111-12.
141. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
142. See Radelet, supra note 122, at 113-15; see also Carrie Manning & Monica
Malbrough, Bilateral Donors and Aid Conditionality in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The
Case of Mozambique, 48 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 143, 147 (2010) ("In general, conditionality
has been found to work best when key actors in recipient countries buy into the goals of
conditionality, when the performance can be verified and then rewarded or punished in a
timely and predictable manner, and when it is clear where responsibility lies for the
implementation of the required measures.").
143. See Manning & Malbrough, supra note 142, at 164-65 (describing the reasons that
conditional aid succeeded in Mozambique's peacebuilding efforts).
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reason why performance within the BIT relationship may improve on
past failures. Unlike traditional aid agencies, which are predisposed
to dispense aid regardless of performance because they have no other
function, the joint committee charged with overseeing reform would
be involved in all parts of the process and so be better equipped to
stay focused on the ultimate objective. For such a committee, with a
clear mandate to produce measurable results, aid would clearly be a
means to an end rather than a de facto end in itself. Accordingly, it
would be more realistic to expect such a committee to resist the
temptation to overlook conditions and instead to use its broader set of
tools to keep looking for solutions to the seemingly intractable
problems.
As may already be implicit in the above discussion, BITs
providing for conditional aid should also include provisions on
technical assistance. Technical assistance is aimed at "helping
develop human, institutional and regulatory capacities in developing
countries."144  Activities may include "drafting constitutions and
legislation; advising on institutional reform; establishing new
institutional frameworks; ... advising on judicial reform; offering
short training courses on specific legal topics; and providing...
guidance on legal education generally."145  It would be a natural
extension for the joint committee in charge of dispensing conditional
aid to take on the role of coordinating expertise-sharing between the
countries.
The obstacles to effective technical assistance largely parallel
those to conditional aid. In particular, there is a risk that experts
from the developed State will attempt to simply "transplant[]" the
rules and systems of their country to the host State without adequate
understanding of "the political ... and social ... context in which it
operates."1 46  The solutions likewise track those I propose above.
Effective technical assistance requires proper buy-in from the host
State: "It is the responsibility of domestic policymakers, supported
by their legal experts, to choose the scope and direction of the
country's legal reform in conformity with the country's needs and
special characteristics."
1 47
144. Technical Assistance and Capacity Building, U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV.,
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/TNCD/Technical-Assistance-and-Capacity-Building-.aspx
(last visited June 5, 2017).
145. Julio Faundez, Legal Technical Assistance, in GOOD GOVERNMENT AND LAW:
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 1 (Julio Faundez ed.,
1997).
146. Id. at 5.
147. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Legal Framework for Development: Role of the World Bank
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Technical assistance is primarily offered by multilateral
institutions such as the World Bank and UNCTAD. 148 Although
provisions on technical assistance have not, to my knowledge,
appeared in BITs, they have been proposed by advocates of the
development model. 149 These advocates acknowledge that "it will be
easiest to negotiate technical assistance commitments that advance
home state interests" and propose as an example "supporting
improvements in the transparency and efficiency of host state
regulation."15  That, of course, is the idea behind the institutional
reform model in general-that it has the potential to advance home
State interests by improving the quality of the host State as a site for
investment.
In sum, rule-of-law values and institutions are not easily
exported, even when the exporting country offers monetary aid and
technical expertise. Nonetheless, there are recognized solutions to
address the primary obstacles and reasons to believe they hold
particular potential to succeed in the context of a BIT relationship.
B. Dispute Resolution
Conditional aid and technical assistance are the most direct
ways to foster institutional reform and have the broadest potential
reach. I turn now to the first of two proposals aimed at facilitating
the reform of specific institutions. One of the consistent findings in
the empirical literature described earlier is that the quality of the host
State's judiciary is important to foreign investors.151 There is a
concern, however, that the standard dispute resolution provisions
contained in existing BITs operate to undermine the domestic courts.
And even if that concern has not been conclusively demonstrated, we
should nonetheless consider whether the provisions could be revised
so that they affirmatively contribute to strengthening the quality of
local courts.
in Legal Technical Assistance, 23 INT'L BUS. LAW. 360, 366 (1995) (emphasis omitted).
148. See id. at 365. UNCTAD specifically works with States "to formulate international
investment rules that effectively foster sustainable development and inclusive growth."
International Investment Agreements (l[As), U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., http://unctad.
org/en/pages/DIAE/International%201nvestment%2Agreements%20(IIA)/International-
Investment-Agreements-(IAs).aspx (last visited June 5, 2017).
149. See World Investment Report 2012, supra note 11, at 129; see also VANDUZER ET
AL., supra note 81, at 498-501 (providing a sample provision).
150. VANDUZERETAL., supra note 81, at 496.
151. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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Most BITs contain a standard consent to arbitration.15 2 That
means that each of the contracting States agrees at the time of the
BIT signing to allow the other State's aggrieved investors to elect to
pursue claims against them in front of a designated arbitral
tribunal."13 This consent clause serves as a continuing offer that the
foreign investor accepts when it chooses to initiate arbitration.154
Most BITs provide for ICSID as the arbitral body,155 but other
institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce and
London Court of International Arbitration, as well as the option of an
ad hoc proceeding, are available.156  Some BITs impose certain
conditions on consent, such as a requirement that local remedies first
be exhausted15 7 or that a certain period of time pass to give the
parties a chance to resolve the dispute amicably. 158 Below, I propose
adapting these very ideas and others so that they work together to
facilitate institutional reform.
By providing an alternative that allows foreign investors to
bypass the local courts, arbitration was supposed to provide a
substitute that would have made domestic judicial reform
unnecessary. But as explained above, given that arbitration is
available only for treaty-based claims and arbitral awards may
require judicial enforcement, foreign investors cannot realistically
expect to avoid local courts entirely. 159 And the empirical evidence
confirms that the anticipated effect is not occurring. In addition to
the general evidence cited earlier that BITs fail to serve as substitutes
for weak domestic institutions, we have more specific evidence that
the arbitration option in particular does not help to attract FDI. Jason
Yackee attempts to isolate the effect of arbitration provisions in a
comparative study of strong and weak BITs, rather than simply
measuring the impact of BITs in the aggregate, as most other studies
have done.16 He defines strong BITs as those that have "effective
152. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 22, at 258.
153. Id. at 257-58.
154. Id. at 258.
155. States separately join the ICSID Convention, which does not in itself constitute
consent to any particular arbitration, but provides a framework of standard clauses and
procedural rules as well as an agreement that JCSID awards are binding and final. See id. at
238-39.
156. Id. at 238, 241.
157. Id. at 264-67.
158. Id. at 268-70.
159. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
160. Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and the
Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW &
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host state pre-consents to investor-initiated arbitration" and weak
BITs as those that do not have such pre-consent.161 The study finds
that strong BITs are not associated with greater foreign investment
levels. 
162
At the same time that the option of arbitration is failing to
attract FDI, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that its
presence may weaken the host State's domestic courts. Tom
Ginsburg contends that when BITs provide investors with access to
arbitration, the ability to "bypass domestic courts may reduce courts'
incentives to improve performance by depriving key actors from a
need to invest in institutional improvement."163  Ginsburg provides
preliminary empirical support for his thesis, citing evidence that
performance on a rule-of-law metric declines in the years after a BIT
is signed.1" This would suggest that investors, though not
adequately assured by the option of arbitration to factor it into their
location decisions, nonetheless come to rely on its availability once
in a particular host State, to the detriment of the local courts. If
correct, the result would be perversely ironic: a provision intended to
appeal to foreign investors would be not only failing to do so, but
also potentially driving them away by weakening an institution that
does actually influence their location decisions.
Ginsburg's evidence is far from conclusive, and there are
reasons to question whether the effect he identifies is occurring. For
the same reason that foreign investors would not perceive arbitration
as an adequate substitute for weak domestic courts when deciding
where to invest, it seems unlikely that these investors would lose any
interest in the quality of the host State's judiciary merely because
arbitration is available. Domestic courts are still needed to enforce
arbitration awards and to resolve domestic law disputes. Thus, as
Susan Franck explains, "[I]f one presumes that foreign investors are
stakeholders who are vital to promoting the rule of law and
Soc'Y REV. 805, 806-07 (2008).
161. Id. at 814.
162. Id. at 827-28.
163. Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 107, 119 (2005).
164. Id. at 121. Others have made similar arguments without empirical support. See,
e.g., MARK HALLE & LuKE ERIK PETERSON, INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS AND INVESTMENT TREATIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 23-24 (Dec. 2005), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/rbap/docs/Research
%20&%20Publications/poverty/RBAP-PR-2005-Investment-Provisions.pdf (arguing that
"BITs... provide foreign investors with the means of detouring around" domestic
institutions and thereby reduce "the impetus for [their] broader improvement").
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institutional integrity, their influence does not exit the market purely
by creating the right to arbitrate treaty claims." '165 Instead, Franck
contends, "[P]roperly valuing the potential role of national courts in
resolving investment disputes suggests that there is a strong incentive
to develop the rule of law in national courts and promote the integrity
of the dispute resolution process."
1 66
Regardless of whether Ginsburg or Franck is correct as to the
effect of existing BITs, the question for present purposes is how BITs
can be designed to optimize any influence they have over the
domestic judiciary. I propose combining several ideas that are
currently in circulation to achieve that effect. One proposed reform
to the arbitration provision is to permit recourse to arbitration only
when the investor's home State authorizes it. Some States have in
fact implemented such a requirement by amending their domestic
laws.
167
Another existing proposal is to reinstate the exhaustion of
local remedies requirement that existed under customary
international law but was overridden in most BITs. Such a
requirement would reduce the bypassing concern identified by
Ginsburg while still preserving the option of arbitration as a last
resort. Franck notes some additional advantages:
Presumably, if foreign investors were required to
litigate disputes through domestic courts rather than
directly taking their claims to international arbitration,
this might build the capacity of local courts by the
following: (1) providing domestic courts with an
opportunity to articulate relevant principles of
domestic law; (2) increasing the transparency of the
system; and (3) giving notice to future investors of the
relevant domestic legal standards and their
application. 168
Advocates for the development model have made a similar proposal,
citing similar benefits.169 A small number of BITs, most of them
older, do include an exhaustion requirement.170  More recently, to
address the concern of delay in domestic court proceedings, a few
165. Franck, supra note 34, at 370 (footnote omitted).
166. Id.
167. Anthea Roberts, Triangular Treaties: The Extent and Limits of Investment Treaty
Rights, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 353, 411 (2015).
168. Franck, supra note 34, at 366 n.144.
169. See VANDUZERETAL., supra note 81, at 413.
170. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 22, at 265.
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BITs have refined the exhaustion requirement by providing for the
option of arbitration if the case is not resolved within a given
timeframe, ranging from six to thirty-six months. 
171
The provisions just described are motivated primarily by the
simple goal of reining in the use of arbitration against host States, but
with some tweaks they can be adapted and combined together to
create stronger incentives for institutional reform. Subject to further
empirical evaluation, and with the caveat that the circumstances in
particular States may vary, my suggestion combines the above ideas
as follows. BITs should reinstate the exhaustion requirement so that
foreign investors' first recourse would be to domestic courts.
However, foreign investors would have two potential paths to
arbitration: if a prescribed time limit for the domestic proceeding is
exceeded, or if, after a proper decision in the domestic case has been
rendered, the investor's home State consents to the arbitration
request.
The rationale behind this proposal is to maximize incentives
for host States to improve their legal systems. 172 The proposal here
puts pressure on host States to reform their judiciaries from the
standpoints of both efficiency and quality. If host States know that
arbitrations may be filed after a certain time period, they will have an
incentive to improve the efficiency of their courts, since most
governments would generally prefer to have investment disputes
resolved in their own system.173  Likewise, if they know that
arbitrations following exhaustion can be filed only with the consent
of the investor's home State, they will have an incentive to build a
more competent and independent judiciary whose decisions the home
State will then be more likely to respect.
As noted at the outset, these changes are designed to
facilitate, and not directly produce, institutional reform. But they
have the potential not only to reduce any negative impact of foreign
171. VANDUZERETAL., supra note 81, at 412 & n.c.
172. Franck notes that it is not self-evident that increasing the involvement of foreign
investors in the domestic legal system will necessarily lead to positive reforms. Franck,
supra note 34, at 370 n.163. It would thus be unwise to rely solely on spurring their efforts
alone.
173. Although Franck's study on the outcomes of investment arbitration suggests that
States are not losing at the high rate that is sometimes postulated, she nonetheless recognizes
the common perception that the system is biased in favor of investors. See Franck, supra
note 30, at 48-50. Moreover, even if States do not lose at an unfairly high rate in arbitration,
they would presumably prefer to resolve investment disputes in their own courts because
those courts possess greater familiarity with the domestic political context and the legitimacy
to rule on matters of public concern. See Chen, supra note 33, at 311-12.
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investors bypassing the local judiciaries, but also to affirmatively
strengthen the courts' capacity by incentivizing the host State to take
action.
C. Dispute Prevention
While a revised approach to dispute resolution could
incentivize improvements to the host State's judiciary, better
mechanisms for dispute prevention could help foster reforms in other
government institutions. The proposal is to create a consultation
mechanism for foreign investors to raise, at an early stage, concerns
about problematic legislation or other government conduct. Such
early intervention encourages cooperation between the investor and
State and can help not only with resolving a particular issue, but also
with enhancing the capacity of the relevant government institutions.
Some States have begun implementing ideas along these
lines. For example, in 1999, South Korea created an Office of
Foreign Investment Ombudsman, which handles between 300 and
500 complaints per year.174 The subjects of the complaints include
labor, taxation, environment, finance, and intellectual property issues,
among others.175  While the office initially resolved approximately
twenty-five percent of disputes, it has progressed to consistently
resolve in the range of ninety percent in more recent years. 176 As an
indicator of success, the country touted, until recently, the fact that no
investor arbitration claim had been filed against it. 177 More broadly,
though no causal claims can be made, it is worth noting that Korea
has experienced substantial year-over-year g owth in FDI, from
$13.67 billion in 2011 to $20.91 billion in 2015.178 The general
package of reforms that Korea implemented in the late 1990s, which
included the creation of the ombudsman office along with other FDI-
174. Franqoise Nicolas et al., Lessons from Investment Policy Reform in Korea 23, 25
(OECD Working Papers on Int'l Inv. 2013/02, 2013), https://www.oecd.org/investment/
investment-policy/WP-2013_2.pdf.
175. See Resolved Cases Introduction, FOREIGN INVESTMENT OMBUDSMAN, http://
ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/rsc/case.do (last visited June 5, 2017).
176. Nicolas et al., supra note 174, at 24-25.
177. Id. at 25. That changed recently when an ICSID arbitration was filed by a U.S.-
based investor in 2012. See $4.68B Lone Star Versus Korea Hearing Begins in Washington
DC, KOREA TIMES (May 15, 2015), http://www.koreatimesus.com/first-hearing-opens-over-
lone-star-asset-sell-offs-in-korea.
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friendly measures, has been identified as a useful model for other
countries seeking to increase foreign investment. 179
Brazil has taken the concept of an ombudsman office and
added it to the recent investment agreements it has signed. Having
mostly sat out when Latin American countries were signing BITs in
large numbers in the 1990s, Brazil developed an alternative model
known as Agreements on Cooperation and Facilitation of
Investments ("ACFIs") and signed six of them in 2015.180 The
ACFIs have been described as curbing the excesses of BITs,
primarily by omitting the fair and equitable treatment provision and
excluding investor-State arbitration.181  The key innovation for
immediate purposes is the provision requiring each State to set up a
focal point, which is modeled after the Korean ombudsman and
provides a mechanism for "dialoguing with government authorities to
address the suggestions and complaints from the other party's
government and investors." 
182
Although Korea's creation of an ombudsman office shows
that domestic law can successfully provide for dispute prevention,
there are potential advantages to creating such mechanisms as part of
a bilateral treaty framework. In particular, focal points created under
the auspices of a BIT can benefit from, as well as deepen, the
cooperative relationship between the contracting States. Focal points
can benefit from this partnership insofar as the States share resources
and expertise; this may be particularly important for developing
countries that, unlike South Korea, lack the capacity to unilaterally
implement the ombudsman concept. At the same time, the regular
flow of communication and resource-sharing can only strengthen the
partnership and thereby enhance the conditional aid and technical
assistance programs described in Section IV.A above. Brazil appears
to recognize the value of this cooperative relationship, as the ACFIs
have paired focal points with the creation of a Joint Committee
consisting of representatives from each government that helps to
179. See Nicolas et al., supra note 174, at 5-6.
180. Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The New Brazilian Agreements
on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFIs): Navigating Between Resistance
and Conformity with the Global Investment Regime 4 (2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload-documents/Morosini%20-%20Global%20
Fellows%20Forum.pdf.
181. See id. at 22-23, 25.
182. Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The Brazilian Agreement on
Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International
Investment Agreements?, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Aug. 2015, at 3, 4, https://www.iisd.
org/sites/default/files/publications/iisd-itn-august-2015-english.pdf.
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facilitate information exchange and problem solving at the State-to-
State level.183
From the standpoint of fostering institutional reform, I would
note first of all that an ombudsman office or focal point is a valuable
institution in and of itself. To the extent that foreign investors are
concerned about bureaucratic inefficiency, they would value the
availability of a one-stop shop where their concerns can be
appropriately directed and escalated and regular communication is
ensured. The early intervention that an ombudsman can provide
helps to minimize harm to the investor, which in turn may forestall
litigation or arbitration and, just as importantly, encourage the firm to
continue or expand its investment presence.
Apart from its value as an institution that prevents disputes, a
foreign investment ombudsman can also be the central clearinghouse
for coordinating broader reforms. One study analyzing the Korean
office's impact emphasizes that, in addition to addressing individual
grievances, it also takes "pre-emptive measures to prevent future
grievances by encouraging systemic improvements and legal
amendments."184  Moreover, the office responded to foreign
investors' concerns about their ability to participate in the
policymaking process with the creation of a new mechanism to
receive such input before regulations are formally adopted.185
Systemic reforms are also facilitated by regular meetings between
representatives of government agencies and a Foreign Investment
Advisory Council, which consists of representatives of foreign
chambers of commerce and CEOs of foreign firms, to discuss
"macro-level issues."186
In short, the creation of a foreign investment ombudsman or
focal point has significant potential not only to prevent specific
disputes, but also to foster broader institutional reform. By using
specific complaints as the impetus for eform conversations, such an
office would nicely complement the conditional aid and technical
assistance committee that would approach the same set of issues with
more of a bird's-eye view.
183. Id. at 4.
184. Nicolas et al., supra note 174, at 24.
185. See KIM, supra note 178, at 56.
186. Id. at 54-55.
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CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for a new approach to BITs. Commentators
have identified a host of flaws in the existing model, and more
importantly developing countries are beginning to question whether it
is still in their interests to participate. While many scholars focus on
tinkering with the investor protection approach, these changes would
at best help limit the costs of BITs without furthering the goal of
increasing FDI. By contrast, advocates for developing countries
offer systemic proposals that could significantly increase the
effectiveness of BITs, but in their repurposing of the model do not
adequately account for the distinct interests of the capital-exporting
States.
This Article offers a new model that remains true to the BIT's
original, shared purpose, but fundamentally rethinks its underlying
premises, rejecting investor protection in favor of a focus on the
domestic institutional environment. Drawing on empirical evidence
showing that the quality of domestic institutions is an important
determinant of foreign investment, the Article contends that BITs
should be redesigned to promote the reform of those institutions.
Prioritizing such reform benefits developing countries directly in a
way that the investor protection model does not, but it also promotes
FDI to the benefit of both States and so is more realistically
attainable than other systemic proposals. And while the revisions
proposed here are not without costs, such an investment in the
international investment law regime may be necessary for its long-
term viability and ultimate success.
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